I don't totally disagree with your line of thinking, and it certainly
works (to some extent) in some situations. One simply looks at the
expenditures on "supercar" development as being marketing costs, like
advertising. But, having worked in advertising myself, I don't know if I
could in good faith advise a client with limited access to capital, who
is losing sales in his largest market segment (family sedans) and is
under immense pressure to modernize his entire product line, while
cutting back on the workforce to improve the "bottom line", to invest
many tens (or hundreds) of millions of dollars in a potentially risky
"marketing scheme".
I would think that attempting to develop a world-class supercar from
"scratch" (i.e. the company has never done anything of the kind before),
in a limited time period (i.e before the money runs out), with limited
funds (i.e. they are losing money on current operations, and had a hard
time finding investors for the buyout), is about as risky a scheme as
could be imagined. Look at the things that will have to go right for it
to be a success:
1. the car will have to be a world-beater first time out (unlike the
XK220), with no extended "teething" period.
2. it will need to be delivered on schedule (the investors will not cut
much slack for delays, and at any rate can't continue losing money on
operations indefinitely waiting for this scheme to "pay off" in sales)
3. it will need to be on budget (this has probably never happened with
supercar development, since you are shooting at a moving target, and need
to push the envelope)
4. it will need to garner positive acclaim and/or immediate racing
success (difficult to guarantee)
5. all these "positive vibes" will need to translate into sales of Rover
sedans and/or MG sports cars. This is by no means guaranteed (ask
Chrysler corporation, when it dominated NASCAR and the NHRA in the 60s,
and was highly regarded for its awesome street cars, but got trounced on
the sales floor). "Win on Sunday, sell on Monday" is more of a myth than
a reality.
I might point out that your example, Audi, has "billions" to invest in
brand marketing. To them, it is justified, since the brand "Audi" has not
previously been identified with high performance; so they are building an
image for the future with the investment, even if not particularly
boosting current sales. In contrast, the MG brand is well known, and it
is associated with performance and racing success, although on the level
of small displacement cars and class wins, not Le Mans victories (in
other words, it doesn't need an "image leader"). Trying to develop an
image of world-class (therefore high-priced) performance is not only a
major departure from the historical roots of the marque, it is not clear
that this would have any benefit for the image of the relatively mundane
vehicles they actually have for sale (does the Dodge Viper make you want
to buy a Neon?). If the Phoenix investors thought it would take billions
to make a success of the MG brand, I don't think they would have gone
through with the deal. My impression was that they were going for a
relatively fast, cheap turnaround, then perhaps a merger or buyout. But
perhaps Mr. Stevens has persuaded them into this change of direction. It
won't be the first time that a charismatic dreamer has led an automaker
down the tubes.
In addition to my objections as a purely business proposition, I also
dispute the value of a "supercar MG" to the marque itself, and to MG
enthusasts in general. MGs are and have been great cars, even though they
never have been competitive with Ferrari, Lamborghini, and McLaren. No
one ever expected them to be -- in contrast, they were affordable,
practical, and fun in everyday use, while competitive on the track in
their class, and sometimes above. This desire to put an MG nameplate on a
200mph exotic is not only presumptuous, but smacks of adolescent wish
fulfillment. And what use is such a car to you or me? We can't afford
one, we'll seldom if ever see one; all we get is the sort of pathetic
bragging rights that a kid who drives a Civic has when a Honda-engined
car wins a Grand Prix. And that is only assuming the thing is any good.
What if this pursuit of the unattainable (and irrelevant) leads to the
bankruptcy and second demise of the marque?
One might also consider that even if this supercar is a complete artistic
and mechanical triumph (if you'll excuse the pun), the Rover/MG company
will not succeed unless its "bread and butter" sedans and small sports
cars are themselves successful. Given that, where should the prudent
director invest his money?
I stand by my position that the proper goal of the MG marque, and its
role in the great scheme of things, is to make moderate priced, good
performing, FUN but practical open sports cars, with GTs and sports
sedans to fill out the line. It would be accomplishment enough if this
new company managed to fulfill this modest program.
Sorry for running on so long...
Max
Kai M. Radicke had this to say:
>I had posted a news bit in June which also said Rover was working in
>conjunction with Lola Cars to produce a supercar to rival the McLaren F1,
>the article posted today (a few weeks later) just helps to give my post more
>believability and believability in such a car.
>
>However Max, while you are right in some respects you fail to realize (or
>mention) the usefulness of such a car. It doesn't matter if Rover turns a
>profit on these cars, or how many cars they produce for that matter. All
>Rover has to do is turn out a batch of these supercars, and establish itself
>as something that equaled or beaten the McLaren F1 road car in top end speed
>and you have birthed a media machine. This is the real payoff, the entire
>Rover group will be viewed in a new light.
[snip]
--
Max Heim
'66 MGB GHN3L76149
If you're near Mountain View, CA,
it's the red one with the silver bootlid.
|